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ABSTRACT
Despite its widespread use in Android apps, reflection poses
graving problems for static security analysis. Currently,
string inference is applied to handle reflection, resulting in
significantly missed security vulnerabilities. In this paper,
we bring forward the ubiquity of incomplete information
environments (IIEs) for Android apps, where some critical
data-flows are missing during static analysis, and the need
for resolving reflective calls under IIEs. We present Ripple,
the first IIE-aware static reflection analysis for Android apps
that resolves reflective calls more soundly than string infer-
ence. Validation with 17 popular Android apps from Google
Play demonstrates the effectiveness of Ripple in discover-
ing reflective targets with a low false positive rate. As a
result, Ripple enables FlowDroid, a taint analysis for An-
droid apps, to find hundreds of sensitive data leakages that
would otherwise be missed. As a fundamental analysis, Rip-
ple will be valuable for many security analysis clients, since
more program behaviors can now be analyzed under IIEs.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Mobile platform security;
Software security engineering; Malware and its mitiga-
tion; •Theory of computation → Program analysis;
Keywords
Android, Reflection Analysis, Pointer Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Android’s increase in popularity and its openness have
triggered a great rise in malware-spreading apps. Static
analysis is a fundamental tool for detecting security threats
in Android apps early at software development time at sig-
nificantly reduced cost. This approach is immune to em-
ulation detection and can provide a comprehensive picture
of an app’s possible behaviors. Therefore, static analysis
finds diverse applications, including data leakage detection
[5, 11, 13, 15], repackaging attack detection [8, 49], security
policy verification [6, 10, 30], security vetting [14, 22, 43],
privacy violations [36], and malware detection [3, 9, 48].
However, reflection, under which a class, method or field
can be manipulated by its string name, poses graving prob-
lems for static analysis. According to a recent study [32],
malware authors can use reflection to hide malicious behav-
iors from detection by all the 10 commercial static analyzers
tested. Similarly, academic static analyzers either ignore
reflection [12, 28, 29, 46] or handle it only partially [5], re-
sulting in also significantly missed program behaviors.
Reflection analysis aims to discover statically the reflective
targets referred to at reflective calls. For Android apps,
regular string inference is currently performed to discover
the string constants used as class/method/field names at
reflective calls [6, 10, 17]. For example, if cName in clz
= Class.forName(cName) is statically discovered to be “A”,
then we know that v points to an object of type A reflectively
created at v = clz.newInstance(). If cName is statically
unknown, then v = clz.newInstance() is ignored.
Regular string inference is inadequate for framework-based
and event-driven Android apps. In practice, reflection anal-
ysis must be performed together with many other analy-
ses, including pointer analysis [13, 18, 19, 21, 37], inter-
component communication (ICC) analysis [27–29], callback
analysis [5, 13, 43, 45], and library summary generation [4, 7,
13]. Soundness, which demands over-approximation, is often
sacrificed in order to achieve efficiency and precision trade-
offs. As a result, class/method/field names used at reflective
calls may be non-constant (either non-null but statically un-
known or simply null). Similarly, the receiver objects at re-
flectively method call sites (i.e., the objects pointed to by v
in Method.invoke(v,...)) may be non-null but with stat-
ically unknown types or simply null. Such information can
be missing due to, for example, unsound library summaries,
unmodeled Android services, code obfuscation, and unsound
handling of hard-to-analyzed Android features such as ICC,
callbacks and built-in containers. In this case, regular string
inference, which keeps track of only constant strings, is in-
effective, resulting in missed program behaviors.
In this paper, we bring forward the ubiquity of incomplete
information environments (IIEs) for Android apps, where
some critical data-flows are inevitably missing during static
analysis. As discussed above, these include not only the case
when class/method/field names are non-null but statically
unknown, which is studied previously for Java programs [18,
19, 21, 37], but also the case when these string names are
null, which is investigated for the first time for Android apps
in this paper. We therefore emphasize the need for resolving
reflective calls in Android apps under IIEs. To this end,
we introduce Ripple, the first IIE-aware static reflection
analysis for Android apps that can resolve reflective calls
more soundly than string inference at a low false positive
rate. We also demonstrate its effectiveness in improving the
precision of an important security analysis.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We present (for the first time) an empirical study for
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IIEs in real-world Android apps, and examine some
common sources of incomplete information, discuss their
impact on reflection analysis, and motivate the need
for developing an IIE-aware reflection analysis.
• We introduce Ripple, the first IIE-aware reflection
analysis for Android apps, which performs type in-
ference automatically (without requiring user annota-
tions) and thus subsumes regular string inference.
• We have implemented Ripple in Soot [42], a static
analysis and optimization framework for Java and An-
droid programs, with Ripple working together with its
Spark, a flow- and context-insensitive pointer analy-
sis. We have evaluated the soundness, precision, scala-
bility and effectiveness of Ripple by using 17 popular
real-world Android apps from Google Play, in which
the data-flows needed for resolving some reflective calls
are null. Ripple discovers 72 more (true) reflective
targets than string inference in seconds at a low false
positive rate of 21.9%. This translates into 310 more
sensitive data leakages detected by FlowDroid [5].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews reflection usage and discusses reflection-related se-
curity vulnerabilities. Section 3 examines the ubiquity of
IIEs. Section 4 describes our Ripple approach. Section 5
gives a formalization of Ripple. Section 6 evaluates Rip-
ple with real-world Android apps. Section 7 discusses the
related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
We review reflection usage in Android apps and discuss
security issues caused if reflection is not handled well.
2.1 Reflection Usage
Android apps are coded in Java. The Java reflection API
provides metaobjects for inspecting classes, methods, and
fields at runtime.
In Figure 1, clz and mtd are metaobjects of classes Class
and Method, respectively. Their names are obtained from
Intent and SharedPreferences, two Android’s built-in con-
tainers. In lines 1 – 2, the class name cName for clz is
retrieved from an intent. Subsequently, in line 6, clz is cre-
ated in a call to Class.forName(). In line 7, v points to an
object reflectively created by clz.newInstance(). In lines
3 – 4, the method name for mtd is retrieved from the map
prefs as the value associated with the key “mtd” or “foo” if
the key “mtd” does not exist yet. In line 8, mtd is created in
a call to clz.getMethod(), which returns a public method
declared in or inherited by clz with a single parameter of
type A. Finally, in line 8, this method is called reflectively by
mtd.invoke(v, a) on the receiver object pointed by v with
the actual argument being a. If mtd is static, then v is null.
Reflection introduces implicitly the caller-callee edges into
the call graph of the program. If one reflective call, e.g.,
Class.forName(), clz.getMethod(), clz.newInstance() or
mtd.invoke(), is ignored, the caller-callee edges in line 9 will
not be discovered. As a result, possible security vulnerabil-
ities in the invisible part of the program will go undetected.
Therefore, the objective of reflection analysis is to discover
the targets at reflective calls (e.g., objects created, methods
called and fields accessed), by working with pointer analysis.
2.2 Reflection-Related Security Issues
1  Intent intent = activity.getIntent();
2  String cName = intent.getStringExtra("class");
3  SharedPreferences prefs = getSharedPreferences(PrefName, 0);
4  String mName = prefs.getString("mtd", "foo");
5  A a = new A();
6  Class clz = Class.forName(cName);
7  Object v = clz.newInstance();
8  Method mtd = clz.getMethod(mName, A.class);
9  mtd.invoke(v, a);
   ...
Figure 1: An example of reflection usage in Android.
In Android apps, reflection serves a number of purposes,
including (1) plug-in and external library support, (2) hid-
den API method invocation, (3) access to private API meth-
ods and fields, and (4) backward compatibility. Indeed, re-
flection is widely used in both benign and malicious Android
apps. For a sample of 202 top-chart free apps from Google
Play that we analyzed on 15 April 2016, we found that 92.6%
of these apps use reflection. Elsewhere, in a malware sam-
ple consisting of 6,141 Android apps from the VriusShare
project [1], 48.13% of them also use reflection.
Reflection is responsible for a number of security exploits
in Android apps. In general, a malicious app retrieves class
and method names as strings externally and invokes meth-
ods in payload classes via reflection to perform malicious ac-
tivities, which are thus disguised from some signature-based
anti-virus software. For example, Obad [41] and FakeIn-
staller [33], represent the two most sophisticated malware
families [31], as they combine reflection and code obfusca-
tion to hide their malicious behaviors. In both cases, the
methods that are used to collect and steal sensitive data are
invoked reflectively with encrypted class and method names.
To elude detection by dynamic analyzers such as Google
Bouncer [26], malicious behaviors are also suppressed by us-
ing logic bombs [12] and emulation detection mechanisms.
As a result, effective static analysis for reflection with a
good precision is needed by the analysis community for An-
droid apps. With such a tool, the malicious behaviors in
malware and the security vulnerabilities caused by misused
reflection in goodware can both be detected.
3. IIES IN ANDROID APPS
There are two types of missing information under IIEs. In
one case, the data flows needed for resolving reflective calls
exist but are statically unknown. Consider the code given in
Figure 1. During the static analysis, cName and mName may
be non-null but are statically unknown. Similarly, v may
point to a non-null object but with a statically unknown
type. In this case, we can resolve the reflective calls in lines
6 – 9 by performing type inference to infer what clz, mtd,
and the objects pointed to by v are, as done previously for
Java programs [18, 19, 37].
In the other case, the data flows needed for resolving re-
flective calls are completely missing, indicated by the pres-
ence of null. To understand this case, which has never been
studied before, for Android apps, we have performed an
empirical study on 45 Android apps, with 20 popular An-
droid apps from Google Play and 25 malware samples from
the VirusShare Project [1]. We discuss the four most com-
mon sources of incomplete information in IIEs: (1) unde-
termined intents, (2) behavior-unknown libraries, (3) unre-
solved built-in containers, and (4) unmodeled services. We
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delve into their bytecode to explain why regular string infer-
ence is inadequate, since it fails to enable FlowDroid [5] to
discover many data leaks from sources (API calls that inject
sensitive information) to sinks (API calls that leak informa-
tion). We also provide insights on why our IIE-aware Ripple
can handle IIEs more effectively than string inference.
3.1 Undetermined Intents
ICC via intents is one of the most fundamental features in
Android as it enables some components to process the data
originating from other components. Thus, the components
in an Android app function as building blocks for the entire
system, enhancing intra- and inter-application code reuse.
In practice, some inter-component control- and data-flows
cannot be captured by ICC analysis [27–29]. If a data flow
from an intent into a reflective call is missing, the reflection
call cannot be fully resolved. The code snippet in Figure 2
taken from the game Angry Birds illustrates this problem.
1 public class MMActivity extends Activity {
2  protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
3   Intent intent = getIntent();
4   String cName = intent.getStringExtra("class");
5   Class clz = Class.forName(cName);
6   MMBaseActivity mmBase = (MMBaseActivity)clz.newInstance();
7   mmBase.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
    ... } }
Android App Name: Angry Birds
Figure 2: Undetermined intents. Here, denotes
a missed data-flow and the post-dominating-
cast-based type inference used in Ripple. These no-
tations are also used in Figures 3 – 5.
In this app, the class name cName is obtained from an
intent (line 4) and then used in a call to Class.forName()
(line 5) to create a class metaobject clz. Then, an object
of this class is created reflectively (line 6) and assigned to
mmBase after a downcast to MMBaseActivity is performed.
Finally, onCreate() is invoked on this object (line 7).
To discover what cName is, we applied IC3, a state-of-the-
art ICC analysis [28], but to no avail. Thus, the data-flow
for cName, denoted by , is missing, rendering clz to be a
null pointer. In this case, string inference is ineffective. As
a result, the reflectively allocated object in line 6 and the
subsequent call on this object in line 7 are ignored.
Ripple is aware of the incomplete information caused by
this undetermined intent, which manifests itself in the form
of cName = null. By taking advantage of the post-dominant
cast MMBaseActivity for clz.newInstance() in line 6, Rip-
ple infers that mmBase may point to five objects with their
types ranging over MMBaseActivity and its four subtypes,
which are all confirmed to be possible by manual code in-
spection. As a result, Ripple discovers 3,928 caller-callee
edges in lines 5 – 7 (directly or indirectly), thereby enabling
FlowDroid [5] to detect 49 new sensitive data leaks that
will be all missed by string inference in this part of the app
that has been made analyzable by Ripple.
3.2 Behavior-Unknown Libraries
To accelerate the analysis of an application, the side ef-
fects of a library on the application are often summarized.
Library summaries are either written manually [13] or gen-
erated automatically [4, 7]. However, both approaches are
error-prone and often fail to model all the side-effects of a
library for all possible analyses. DroidSafe [13] provides the
Android Device Implementation (ADI) to model the An-
droid API and runtime manually, with about 1.3 MLOC for
Android 4.4.3. However, as the Android framework evolves
with both new features and undocumented code added, how
to keep this ADI in sync can be a daunting task.
Therefore, unsound library summaries are an important
source of incomplete information in IIEs. The code snippet
in Figure 3 taken from the app Twist illustrates this issue.
1 private static void writeToLog(UnityAdsDeviceLogEntry entry) {
2  String mName = entry.getLogLevel().getReceivingMethodName();
3  Method logMtd = Log.class.getMethod(mName, 
String.class, String.class);
4  String tag = ...;
5  String msg = ...;
6  logMtd.invoke(null, tag, msg); } }
7 public class Log {
8  public static int i(String tag, String msg) {}
9  public static int d(String tag, String msg) {}
10 public static int w(String tag, String msg) {}
11 public static int e(String tag, String msg) {}
12 public static int v(String tag, String msg) {}
13 public static int wtf(String tag, String msg) {}
... }
Android App Name: Twist
Sink 
Calls
Sensitive data
Figure 3: Behavior-unknown libraries. Here,
marks the target methods invoked at a reflective
call, denotes sensitive data-flow, and de-
notes tainted data. These notations, together with
those in Figure 2, are also used in Figures 4 and 5.
This code snippet is used to log messages at different ver-
bosity levels. In line 2, a method name mName is retrieved.
In line 3, its method metaobject logMtd is created. In line
6, this method, which is static, is invoked reflectively.
If we apply FlowDroid [5] to detect data leaks in this
app, by relying on string inference to perform reflection anal-
ysis, then the reflective call logMtd.invoke() in line 6 will
be ignored. In FlowDroid, the behaviors of maps are not
summarized. However, entry was retrieved from a HashMap
and then passed to writeToLog. Thus, mName = null, ren-
dering string inference to be ineffective.
Ripple is aware of unsound library summaries and thus
attempts to infer the target methods at logMtd.invoke().
Based on the facts that (1) these methods are static (since
the receiver object is null), declared in or inherited by class
android.util.Log, (2) each target method has two formal
parameters, and (3) each parameter has a type that is either
String or its supertype or its subtype, Ripple concludes
that the six target methods, i(), d(), w(), e(), v() and
wtf(), as shown in class android.util.Log may be poten-
tially invoked. According to FlowDroid, these six meth-
ods are all sinks for sensitive data contained in msg. Thus,
resolving logMtd.invoke() causes 12 data leaks from two
different sensitive data sources to be reported (as 2 sources
× 6 sinks = 12 leaks). By manual code inspection, we found
that the first four methods, i(), d(), w() and e(), shaded
in class android.util.Log are true targets, implying that 8
data leaks will not be reported if string inference is used.
3.3 Unresolved Built-in Containers
Android apps can receive a variety of user inputs from,
e.g., intents, databases, internet, GUI actions, and system
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events. These data are stored in different types of containers,
such as Bundle, SharedPreferences, ContentValues and
JSONObject, for different purposes. Unhandled user inputs
represent an important source of incomplete information in
IIEs. The code snippet in Figure 4 taken from a game named
Seven Knights illustrates this problem.
1 public static WXMediaMessage fromBundle(Bundle bundle) {
2   String cName = bundle.getString("_wxobject_identifier_");
3   Class clz = Class.forName(cName);
4   IMediaObject media = (IMediaObject) clz.newInstance();
5   media.unserialize(bundle); }
6 public class WXFileObject implements IMediaObject {
7   public void unserialize(Bundle bundle) {
8     Object s = bundle.getString("_wxfileobject_filePath");
      ... } }
Android App Name: Seven Knights
Figure 4: Unresolved Bundles.
In this code snippet, different types of objects are created
(line 4) to handle different types of media data according to
their unique identifiers stored in a Bundle (line 2), which is
constructed according to the types of media introduced by
third-party apps. IMediaObject is an interface implemented
by eight types (i.e., classes) of media, with only WXFileOb-
ject shown partially. Therefore, cName represents the name
of one of these eight classes. In line 4, media points to a
reflectively created object of the class identified by cName.
In line 5, a call is made to unserialize() on the receiver
object pointed to by media with bundle as its argument.
If we apply again FlowDroid to detect data leaks in this
app, by relying on string inference to resolve the reflective
calls in the app, then cName will be null, since the behaviors
of bundles are not modeled in FlowDroid. As a result, the
reflectively created object in line 4 and the subsequent call
on this object in line 5 will be ignored.
By being IIE-aware, Ripple will infer the inputs retrieved
from bundle to resolve the call to clz.newInstance() in
line 4. By taking advantage of the post-dominant cast IMe-
diaObject for this reflective call, Ripple deduces that media
points to potentially eight objects with their types ranging
over all the eight classes implementing IMediaObject, con-
firmed by manual code inspection. As a result, a total of 37
caller-callee edges, together with 16 sensitive data sources,
which would otherwise be missed by string inference, are
discovered in lines 3 – 5 directly or indirectly. Currently,
these 16 sensitive data sources do not flow to any sinks but
may do so in a future app release. The resulting leaks will
be then detected by FlowDroid, assisted by Ripple.
3.4 Unmodeled Services
The Android framework provides an abstraction of abun-
dant services for a mobile device, such as obtaining the de-
vice status, making phone calls, and sending text messages,
which are all related to critical program behaviors. These
services are usually initialized during system startup and
subsequently used by calling the factory methods in the An-
droid framework with often reflective calls involved. Un-
sound modeling for Android’s system-wide services can be
an important source of incomplete information in IIEs. The
code snippet in Figure 5 taken from a text message manage-
ment app named GO SMS Pro illustrates this issue.
In line 2, clz represents a class metaobject for android.
Source call
1 public void getSubScriberId() {
2  Class clz = Class.forName("android.telephony.TelephonyManager");
3  Method getDefMtd = clz.getMethod("getDefault");
4  Object telephonyManager = getDefMtd.invoke(null);
5  Method getSubIdMtd = clz.getMethod("getSubscriberId");
6  String id = (String) getSubIdMtd.invoke(telephonyManager); 
   ... } Sensitive 
dataSink
Android App Name: Go SMS Pro
Figure 5: Unmodeled services.
telephony.TelephonyManager. In line 3, getDefMtd repre-
sents a method metaobject for a static method named get-
Default in clz. In line 4, this method is invoked reflec-
tively, with its returned object, an instance of clz, assigned
to telephonyManager. In lines 5 – 6, a method metaob-
ject, getSubIdMtd, for an instance method named getSub-
scribeId in clz is created and then invoked reflectively on
the receiver object pointed to by telephonyManager.
In this code snippet, all the class and method names
are string constants. Thus, regular string inference can re-
solve precisely the reflective targets at all the reflective calls
shown. However, this still does not enable the target meth-
ods invoked in line 6 to be analyzed, because the getDefault
method invoked in line 4 is part of the hidden API and thus
not available for analysis. Thus, telephonyManager is null,
causing the reflective call in line 6 to be skipped.
Ripple is aware of the existence of unmodeled services.
By examining the class type in the getSubIdMtd metaob-
ject, Ripple concludes that telephonyManager points to an
object of type android.telephony.TelephonyManager. As
a result, the reflective call in line 6 can be resolved, result-
ing in the target method getSubscriberId to be discovered.
For this app, FlowDroid is unscalable. Otherwise, the po-
tential data link as shown will be detected automatically.
Finally, if the getDefault method is native with its method
body unmodeled but available for analysis, then Ripple will
be able to infer in line 4 that telephonyManager may point
to an object of type android.telephony.TelephonyManager.
As a result, the reflective call in line 6 can also be resolved.
4. METHODOLOGY
Figure 6 depicts an overview of Ripple, an IIE-aware re-
flection analysis introduced in this paper for Android apps.
Currently, we consider four important contributing factors
to IIEs when the data-flows needed for resolving reflective
calls are null: undetermined intents, behavior-unknown li-
braries, unresolved containers and unmodeled services, as
discussed in Section 3. To handle IIEs effectively, Ripple
resolves reflective calls in the presence of incomplete infor-
mation about these calls, so that their induced caller-callee
edges can be discovered. Once the call graph of an app
is available, many client analyses, such as data leakage de-
tection, security policy verification, malware detection, and
security vetting, can be performed to detect various security
issues, especially those hidden in some reflective calls, in the
app.
We have developed Ripple by leveraging recent advances
on reflection analysis for Java [18, 19]. Conceptually, Ripple
performs reflection analysis by distinguishing three cases:
• Case 1. String Inference for Constant Strings. If
class/method/field names used at reflective calls are string
4
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Figure 6: An overview of RIPPLE.
constants, regular string inference is conducted.
• Case 2. Type Inference for Unknown Strings. If
class/method/field names are non-constant but non-null
strings, which may be read from configuration files or com-
mand lines, then type inference that was previously intro-
duced for Java programs [18, 19, 21, 37] can be leveraged.
• Case 3. Type Inference for Information-Missing
Reflective Calls. Again, type inference is performed
to infer the missing information at reflective calls in the
following three categories, as reviewed in Section 3:
– Null-Name. Class, method or field names are null,
as illustrated in Figure 2 (with cName = null for un-
determined intents), Figure 3 (with mName = null for
behavior-unknown libraries), and Figure 4 (with cName
= null for unmodeled bundles). We will replace a null
object by an unknown string and then go back to Case 2.
– Missing-RecvObj. Given a call to mtd.invoke(y,...),
a target method pointed to by mtd does not have a
corresponding receiver object pointed to by y, as illus-
trated in Figure 5 for the getSubscriberId method in-
voked in line 6, where telephonyManager = null. If we
know the class type of the target method pointed to by
mtd, its corresponding receiver object can be inferred.
– Missing-RetObj. Given x = mtd.invoke(...), a tar-
get method pointed to by mtd is available for analysis
but its method body is unmodeled. This can happen to
telephonyManager = getDefMt.invoke(null) in Fig-
ure 5, as discussed in Section 3, when the getDefault
method is hypothetically assumed to be an unmodeled
native method. In general, if we know the return type
of the target method pointed to by mtd, then objects of
this type or its subtypes are created and assigned to x.
To the best of our knowledge, Ripple is the first auto-
mated reflection analysis (without relying on user annota-
tions) for handling Cases 2 and 3 and also the first for han-
dling Cases 1 – 3 in a unified framework for Android apps.
In Ripple, reflection analysis is performed together with
pointer analysis mutually recursively, as effectively one sin-
gle analysis. On one hand, reflection analysis makes use of
the points-to information to resolve reflective calls. On the
other hand, pointer analysis needs the results of reflection
analysis to determine which methods get called and which
fields get accessed. Once the entire analysis for an app is
over, its call graph is readily available (at the same time).
5. FORMALISM
We formalize Ripple as a form of reflection analysis, per-
formed together with a flow- and context-insensitive pointer
analysis. We restrict ourself to a small core of the Java reflec-
tion API, including Class.forName(), Class.newInstance(),
Class.getMethod(), and Method.invoke(). For simplicity,
we consider only instance methods as static methods are
handled similarly. We focus only on reflective method calls
as our formalism extends easily to reflective field accesses.
5.1 Notations
Figure 7 gives the domains used in our formalism. The
abstract heap objects are labeled by their allocation sites.
C represents the set of class metaobjects and M the set of
method metaobjects. The class type of a class or method
metaobject is identified by its superscript and the signature
of a method metaobject, which consists of the method name
and descriptor (i.e., return type and parameter types), is
identified by its subscript. In particular, u indicates an un-
known class type or an unknown method signature (with
some parts of the signature being statically unknown).
class type t, u ∈ T
variable v ∈ V
abstract heap object ot1, o
t
2, o , ... ∈ O
class metaobject ct, cu, c , ... ∈ C
method metaobject mts,m
u
s ,m
t
u,m
u
u,m , ... ∈ M = T× S
method name n ∈ N
method parameter type p ∈ P = ⋃∞i=0 Ti
method signature s, u ∈ S = T× N× P
Figure 7: Domains.
5.2 Pointer Analysis
Figure 8 gives a standard formulation of a flow- and context-
insensitive Andersen’s pointer analysis [2]. pts(v) represents
the points-to set of a pointer v. An array object is analyzed
with its elements collapsed to a single field, say, arr.
In a reflection-free program, only five types of statements
exist. In [P-New], oti uniquely identifies the abstract object
created as an instance of t at this allocation site, labeled by
i. In [P-Copy], the points-to facts flow from the RHS to the
LHS of a copy statement. In [P-Load] and [P-Store], the
fields of an abstract object oti are distinguished.
In [P-Call] (for non-reflective calls), the function
dispatch(oti,m) is used to resolve the virtual dispatch of
method m on the receiver object oti to be m
′. We assume
that m′ has a formal parameter m′this for the receiver ob-
ject and m′p0 , . . . ,m
′
pn−1 for the remaining parameters, and
a pseudo-variable m′ret is used to hold the return value of m
′.
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i : x = new t() [P-New] x = y [P-Copy]
{oti} ⊆ pts(x) pts(y) ⊆ pts(x)
x = y.f [P-Load] x.f = y [P-Store]
oti ∈ pts(y)
pts(oti.f) ⊆ pts(x)
oti ∈ pts(x)
pts(y) ⊆ pts(oti.f)
x = y.m(arg0, , . . . , argn−1) [P-Call]
oti ∈ pts(y) m′ = dispatch(oti,m)
{oti} ⊆ pts(m′this) pts(m′ret) ⊆ pts(x)
∀ 0 6 k < n : pts(argk) ⊆ pts(mpk )
Figure 8: Rules for pointer analysis.
5.3 Reflection Analysis: Cases 1 and 2
Figure 9 gives the rules for resolving reflective calls for
Cases 1 and 2 in Figure 6 simultaneously. Ripple is the
first to combine both cases in reflection analysis for Android
apps. In Case 1, regular string inference for constant class
and method names is applied. In Case 2, type inference
for non-constant but non-null class and method names is
applied. As discussed earlier, reflective field accesses are
omitted. Recall that <: denotes the subtyping relation.
Let us now examine the five rules for Cases 1 and 2.
[C12-ForName] handles a Class.forName(cName) call. For
the auxiliary function toClass : O → C, toClass(oString)
takes a string object oString and returns its corresponding
class metaobject. If oString is a constant, then toClass(o) =
ct, where t is the class type named by cName. Otherwise,
toClass(oString) = cu, since cName is a non-constant but no-
null string. In this rule, clz is thus made to point to either
ct or cu accordingly. In the case of cu, the missing type may
be inferred when it is used in a subsequent reflective call.
[C12-GetMtd] handles a clz.getMethod(mName,...)
call analogously. For the auxiliary function, toMtdSig : C×
O → P(S), toMtdSig(c−, oString) returns the set of method
signatures for the methods declared in or inherited by the
class c− with their method name identified by mName. If
c− = cu but mName is a string constant, say,“foo”, then foo is
recorded: toMtdSig(c−, oString) = {(u, foo, u)}. If mName is
a non-constant but no-null string, then toMtdSig(c−, oString)
= {(u)}. Therefore, this rule distinguishes two cases for ev-
ery signature s ∈ toMtdSig(c−, oString). If c− = ct is a
statically known type t, a method metaobject mts is created.
Otherwise, a method metaobject mus is created. In both
cases, the missing information in a method metaobject may
be inferred when it is used in a subsequent reflective call.
[C12-New] handles reflective object allocation at a call to
x = (T) clz.newInstance(), where T symbolizes an intra-
procedurally post-dominating type cast for the call if it ex-
ists or java.lang.Object otherwise. If c− = ct is a stati-
cally known type t, then x = clz.newInstance() degener-
ates into x = new t() and can thus be handled as in [P-
New]. Otherwise, c− = cu. If T 6= java.lang.Object, then
u is inferred to be T or any of its subtypes.
There are two rules for handling reflective method invoca-
tion. To infer a target method invoked reflectively, we need
to infer its class type, which is handled by [C12-InvType],
and its signature, which is handled by [C12-InvSig].
[C12-InvType] is simple. The class type of a method
metaobject mu is inferred to be mt for every possible dy-
Class clz = Class.forName(cName) [C12-ForName]
oString ∈ pts(cName) c = toClass(oString)
pts(clz) ⊇
{{ct} if c = ct
{cu} if c = cu
Method mtd = clz.getMethod(mName, ) [C12-GetMtd]
oString ∈ pts(mName) c ∈ pts(clz) s ∈ toMtdSig(c , oString)
pts(mtd) ⊇
{{mts} if c = ct
{mus } if c = cu
i : x = (T) clz.newInstance() [C12-New]
c ∈ pts(clz)
pts(x) ⊇
{{oti} if c = ct
{oti | t <: T} if c = cu
= mtd.invoke(y, ) [C12-InvType]
ot ∈ pts(y) mu ∈ pts(mtd)
pts(mtd) ⊇ {mt}
= (T) mtd.invoke( , args) [C12-InvSig]
m−u ∈ pts(mtd) t: T p ∈ toParasTys(args)
pts(mtd) ⊇ {m−s | s.para = p ∧ s.ret = t }
Figure 9: Rules for Cases 1 and 2 in Figure 6.
namic type t of every receiver object pointed to by y.
[C12-InvSig] is slightly more involved in handling (T)
mtd.invoke(_, args), where T is defined identically as in
[C12-New]. This rule attempts to infer the missing infor-
mation in the signature s of a method from its args and
its possible return type. Here, we write s.para and s.ret
to identity its parameter types and return type, respec-
tively. The typing relation : is defined by distinguishing
two cases. First, u: java.lang.Object. Second, if t is not
java.lang.Object, then t′ : t holds if and only if t′ <: t
or t <: t′ holds. Therefore, s.ret is deduced from a post-
dominating cast T (which is not java.lang.Object). As
for s.para, we infer it intra-procedurally from args. For the
auxiliary function toParaTys :
⋃∞
i=0 V
i → P(S),
toParaTys(args) returns the set of parameter types of a
target method invoked with its argument list args, com-
puted only intra-procedurally for efficiency reasons. If args
is not defined locally, i.e., not in the same method contain-
ing the reflective method call, then toParaTys(args) = ∅.
Otherwise, let Di be the set of declared types of all possible
variables assigned to the i-th argument args[i]. Let Pi =
{t′ | t ∈ Di ∧ (t′ <: t ∨ t <: t′)}. Then, toParaTys(args) =
P0 × · · · × Pn−1. With s.para or s.ret inferred for m−u , mtd
is made to point to a new method metaobject m−s , where s
contains the missing information in u deduced via inference.
5.4 Reflection Analysis: Case 3
Figure 10 gives the rules for resolving reflective calls for
Case 3 in Figure 6. There are four rules for handling three
categories of incomplete information, Null-Name, Missing-
RecvObj and Missing-RetObj, as discussed in Section 4.
[C3-ForName] and [C3-GetMtd] deal with Null-Name
by treating null as a non-constant string and then resorting
to [C12-New], [C12-InvType] and [C12-InvSig] to infer
the missing information. [C3-ForName] handles a Class.
forName(cName) call with cName = null identically as how
[C12-ForName] handles a Class.forName(cName) call when
cName is a non-constant string. Similarly, [C3-GetMtd]
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Class clz = Class.forName(cName) [C3-ForName]
pts(cName) = ∅
pts(clz) ⊇ {cu}
Method mtd = clz.getMethod(mName, ) [C3-GetMtd]
pts(mName) = ∅ c ∈ pts(clz)
pts(mtd) ⊇
{{mtu} if c = ct
{muu} if c = cu
i : = mtd.invoke(y, ) [C3-InvRecv]
t′′ ∈ ({ t | mt ∈ pts(mtd) } \ { t′ | ot ∈ pts(y) ∧ t <: t′ })
t′′ 6= java.lang.Object
pts(y) ⊇ {ot′′′i | t′′′ : t′′}
i : x = mtd.invoke( , ) [C3-InvRet]
m−s ∈ pts(mtd) s.ret = t t′ <: t ∀ ot
′′ ∈ pts(x) : t′′ 6<: t
t 6= java.lang.Object
pts(x) ⊇ {ot′}
Figure 10: Rules for Case 3 in Figure 6.
handles a clz.getMethod(mName,...) call with mName =
null identically as how [C12-GetMtd] handles a
clz.getMethod(mName,...) call when mName is a non-constant
string.
[C3-InvRecv] handlesMissing-RecvObj by inferring the
missing receiver objects pointed to by y from the known class
types of all possibly invokable target methods, except that
java.lang.Object is excluded for precision reasons. This
rule covers an important special case when pts(y) = ∅.
[C3-InvRet] handles Missing-RetObj by inferring the
missing objects returned from a target method that is un-
modeled (with its body missing) but available for analysis
from the return type s.ret of its signature s. Objects of all
possible subtypes of s.ret are included in pts(x), unless x
already points to an object of one of these subtypes.
5.5 Transforming Reflective to Regualar Calls
Fig. 11 shows how to transform a reflective into a regular
call, which will be analyzed by pointer analysis.
x = mtd.invoke(y, args) [T-Inv]
mts ∈ pts(mtd) m′ ∈MTD(mts) oi ∈ pts(args)
ot
′
j ∈ pts(oi .arr) t′′ is declaring type of m′pk k ∈ [0, n− 1] t′ <: t′′
{ot′j } ⊆ pts(argk) x = y.m′(arg0, ..., argn−1)
Figure 11: Rule for Transformation.
For the auxiliary function MTD : M → P(M), where M
is the set of methods in the program, MTD(mts) is the stan-
dard lookup function for finding the methods in M according
to a declaring class t and a signature s for a method metaob-
ject, except that (1) the return type in s is also considered
and (2) any u in s is treated as a wild card.
As discussed earlier, args points to a 1-D array of type
Object[], with its elements collapsed to a single field arr
during the pointer analysis. Let arg0,. . . , argn−1 be the n
freshly created arguments to be passed to each potential tar-
get method m′ found by in MTD(mts). Let m
′
p0 , . . . ,m
′
pn−1
be the n parameters (excluding this) of m′, such that the
declaring type of m′pk is t
′′. We include ot
′
j to pts(argk) only
when t′ <: t′′ holds in order to filter out the objects that
cannot be assigned to m′pk . Finally, the regular call obtained
can be analyzed by [P-Call] in Figure 8.
5.6 Examples
Let us apply Ripple to the app in Figure 2. Due to an
undetermined intent in line 3, cName is null in line 4. By ap-
plying [C3-ForName] to Class.forName(cName) in line 5,
we obtain pts(clz) = {cu}. In line 6, we apply [C12-New]
to obtain pts(mmBase) = {oMMBaseActivity6 , oAdViewOverlayActivity6 ,
oBridgeMMMedia$PickerActivity6 , o
CachedVideoPlayerActivity
6 , o
VideoPlayerActivity
6 },
as these five class types are deduced from the post-dominating
cast MMBaseActivity for the call to clz.newInstance() in
line 6. As a result, Ripple discovers 3,928 caller-callee edges
in lines 5 – 7 (directly or indirectly), thereby enabling Flow-
Droid [5] to detect 49 sensitive data leaks along these edges.
Let us apply Ripple to the app in Figure 5. As getDe-
fault is a hidden API method and thus unavailable for anal-
ysis, telephonyManager = null. By applying [C3-InvRecv]
to getSubIdMtd.invoke(telephonyManager) in line 6, we
can deduce precisely that pts(telephonyManager) =
{oTelephonyManager6 }. In this app, TelephonyManager has no
subtypes but only java.lang.Object as its supertype. This
allows the potential leak highlighted in Figure 5 to be de-
tected. If getDefault were unmodeled but available for
analysis, then we would be able to apply [C3-InvRet] to
getDefMtd.invoke(null) in line 4 to infer the missing ob-
ject returned: pts(telephonyManager) = {oTelephonyManager4 }.
Again, the same sensitive data leak will be detected.
6. EVALUATION
We demonstrate that Ripple is significantly more effec-
tive than string inference for real-world Android apps by
addressing the following four research questions:
• RQ1. Is Ripple capable of discovering more reflective
targets, i.e., more sound than string inference?
• RQ2. Can Ripple achieve this with a good precision?
• RQ3. Does Ripple scale for real-world Android apps?
• RQ4. Is Ripple effective in enabling existing Android
security analyses to detect security vulnerabilities?
To answer RQ1 – RQ3, we examine the reflective tar-
gets resolved by Ripple in Android apps. To answer RQ4,
we investigate how Ripple enables FlowDroid [5], a taint
analysis for Android apps, to find more sensitive data leaks.
Android Apps. Real-world Android apps rather than syn-
thetic benchmarks are used in our experiments. We exam-
ined the top-chart free applications from Google Play down-
loaded on 15 April 2016, which are the most popular apps in
the official app store. A set of 17 apps is selected, such that
they exhibit a wide range of incomplete information, with
null class and method names, as discussed in Section 3, and
they are scalable under FlowDroid within 2 hours.
State-of-the-Art Reflection Analysis. To resolve reflection
for Android apps, there are only two existing static tech-
niques, with both performing string inference (for constant
strings), Checker [6, 10] and DroidRA [17]. We cannot
compare with Checker since its reflection analysis relies on
user annotations. We cannot compare with DroidRA ei-
ther, since its latest open-source tool (released on 9 Septem-
ber 2016) is unstable. For the 17 apps selected, DroidRA
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Table 1: Soundness and precision. RIPPLE always finds every true reflective target that STRINF does. The
numbers in bold indicate that RIPPLE finds more true targets than STRINF. A reflective call in app is
considered to be reachable if it can be reached from the harness main() in its call graph.
App (Package Name)
StrInf Ripple
Class.newInstance() Method.invoke() Class.newInstance Method.invoke()
#Calls #Targets #Calls #Targets #Calls #Targets #Calls #Targets
Reachable Resolved Resolved True Reachable Resolved Resolved True Reachable Resolved Resolved True Reachable Resolved Resolved True
com.facebook.orca 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 7 7
com.netmarble.sknightsgb 2 0 0 0 11 4 8 4 2 2 26 11 11 4 8 4
com.productmadness.hovmobile 1 0 0 0 7 5 31 29 1 1 11 1 7 5 31 29
com.facebook.moments 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 7 7
me.msqrd.android 0 0 0 0 11 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 11 4 4 4
com.nordcurrent.canteenhd 3 0 0 0 16 5 6 5 4 3 27 10 20 5 6 5
com.ea.game.simcitymobile row 0 0 0 0 6 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 6 2 2 2
com.imangi.templerun 0 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 1 1 1
com.rovio.angrybirds 3 1 1 1 10 3 3 3 3 2 6 6 14 8 13 11
com.sgn.pandapop.gp 0 0 0 0 13 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 13 3 3 3
com.gameloft.android.
ANMP.GloftA8HM
1 1 16 16 9 0 0 0 1 1 16 16 9 0 0 0
com.appsorama.kleptocats 2 2 5 5 3 0 0 0 2 2 5 5 3 1 6 4
air.au.com.metro.DumbWaysToDie 1 0 0 0 18 8 34 34 1 1 5 5 21 11 37 37
com.ketchapp.twist 3 2 5 5 8 2 2 2 3 2 5 5 8 3 8 6
com.stupeflix.legend 4 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 4 3 13 5 1 0 0 0
com.maxgames.stickwarlegacy 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 7 5
air.com.tutotoons.app.
animalhairsalon2jungle.free
0 0 0 0 14 7 43 43 0 0 0 0 14 7 43 43
Total 21 8 29 29 148 45 138 131 22 17 114 64 159 58 183 168
resolves some reflective targets for 6 apps, fails to produce
any outputs for another 6 apps, and crashes for the remain-
ing 5 apps. These problems were reported to and confirmed
by the authors, but they still remain despite a recent release.
Both Checker and DroidRA perform essentially regular
string inference, which is subsumed by Ripple as shown in
Case 1 (for constant strings) in Figure 6. Checker handles
non-constant strings with user annotations only. Instead of
comparing with Checker and DroidRA directly, we com-
pare Ripple with StrInf, which is a simplified Ripple that
performs only regular string inference in Case 1.
Implementation. We have implementedRipple in Soot [42],
a static analysis framework for Android and Java programs.
Ripple works with its Spark, a flow- and context-insensitive
pointer analysis, to resolve reflection and points-to informa-
tion in a program. Based on the results of this joint analysis,
the call graph of the program, on which many security anal-
yses such as FlowDroid operate, can be constructed.
Currently, Ripple is implemented in Java with about 3,500
LOC, handling the most significant reflective calls that af-
fect the static analysis of Android apps: Class.forName(),
Class.newInstance(), Method.invoke(), and all four
method-introspecting calls, Method.getMethod(), Method.
getDeclaredMethod(), Method.getMethods(), and
Method.getDeclaredMethods().
Computing Platform. Our experiments are carried out on
a Xeon E5-2650 2GHz machine with 64GB RAM running
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. The time measured for analyzing an app
by a particular analysis is the average of 20 runs.
6.1 RQ1: More Soundness
Table 1 compares Ripple and StrInf in terms of the
number of reflective targets discovered at all reflective calls
to Class.newInstance() and Method.invoke(). For the
former, a target means a reflectively created object. For the
latter, a target means a reflectively invoked method. Each
app is uniquely identified by its package name. For each of
these two methods, only its calls reachable from the harness
main() used during the analysis are included. We determine
whether a target is true or not by manual code inspection.
By design, Ripple always finds every true target that
StrInf does. In 11 out of the 17 apps, Ripple has suc-
cessfully discovered more true targets than StrInf. This
highlights the importance of making reflection analysis fully
IIE-aware for Android apps, by handling not only Case 2 as
for Java programs [18, 19, 21, 37] but also Case 3.
In the 17 Android apps, Ripple finds a total of 64 and 168
but StrInf finds only a total of 29 and 131 true targets for
Class.newInstance() and Method.invoke(), respectively.
Therefore, for both methods combined, Ripple finds 232
but StrInf finds only 160 true targets in total, yielding
a net gain of 72 true targets and thus a 45% increase in
soundness on reflection analysis.
Let us revisit some examples in Section 3. Consider the
app in Figure 2. For the call to clz.newInstance() in line 6,
Ripple infers five reflectively created objects, which are all
true targets configured to provide different forms of adver-
tisement. A similar pattern appears also in the app named
Dumb Ways to Die. Consider now the app in Figure 4. For
the call to clz.newInstance() in line 4, Ripple infers 8
reflectively created objects, which are all true targets used
for handling eight different types of media according to user
inputs. All these targets are missed by StrInf, which relies
only on a simple string analysis for string constants.
6.2 RQ2: Precision
Table 1 reveals also the false positive rates for bothRipple
and StrInf. Ripple finds a total of 297 reflective targets
with 232 true targets, representing a false positive rate of
21.9%. StrInf finds a total of 167 reflective targets with
160 true targets, representing a false positive rate of 4.2%.
Due to 72 more true targets discovered, as discussed in
Section 6.1, Ripple is regarded to exhibit a satisfactory pre-
cision for Android apps. For many security analyses such as
security vetting and malware detection, and even debug-
ging, it is important to analyze reflection-related program
behaviors even if doing so may cause some false warnings
to be triggered. Consider the app in Figure 3. For the call
to logMtd.invoke(null, tag, msg) in line 6, Ripple infers
its target to be the six methods, i(), d(), w(), e(), v() and
wtf() in class Log, where the last two are false positives, en-
abling FlowDroid to report 12 leaks via msg from two data
sources, with 4 from v() and wtf() being false positives.
We can lift the precision of Ripple by improving the pre-
cision of its collaborating analyses. Currently, Ripple works
with Spark, a flow- and context-insensitive pointer analysis,
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Table 2: Efficiency and effectiveness. For efficiency, the analysis times of RIPPLE, STRINF and SPARK are
compared, by using the final harness (iteratively) constructed for an app by FlowDroid. For each analysis,
the number of call graph (CG) edges discovered is also given. For effectiveness, the number of data leaks,
together with sensitive source and sink calls, found by FlowDroid under RIPPLE, STRINF and SPARK are
compared. The numbers in bold indicate that FlowDroid reports more leaks under RIPPLE than STRINF.
App Package Name
Spark StrInf Ripple
CG
Edges
Analysis
Time (s)
Source
Calls
Sink
Calls
Total
Leaks
CG
Edges
Analysis
Time (s)
Source
Calls
Sink
Calls
Total
Leaks
CG
Edges
Analysis
Time (s)
Source
Calls
Sink
Calls
Total
Leaks
com.facebook.orca 5583 2.0 43 115 15 5598 2.1 43 115 15 5605 2.2 43 115 15
com.netmarble.sknightsgb 12113 7.9 194 208 92 12148 8.0 194 208 96 12779 8.4 210 212 142
com.productmadness.hovmobile 6009 2.7 119 113 41 6278 3.1 119 113 44 6480 3.2 119 116 48
com.facebook.moments 6632 2.5 39 145 10 6647 2.6 39 145 10 6654 2.7 39 145 10
me.msqrd.android 10561 4.7 127 107 24 11064 4.8 127 107 25 11064 4.9 127 107 25
com.nordcurrent.canteenhd 16698 9.8 182 305 182 16759 10 182 305 184 21625 12.8 199 327 289
com.ea.game.simcitymobile row 8369 4.1 111 170 41 8403 4.2 111 172 50 8403 4.4 111 172 50
com.imangi.templerun 10584 2.3 184 110 54 10592 2.5 184 110 54 10592 2.6 184 110 54
com.rovio.angrybirds 12705 7.0 244 180 66 13448 7.4 245 206 66 17384 10.2 276 266 120
com.sgn.pandapop.gp 10557 5.3 217 365 552 10588 5.9 217 365 575 10590 5.9 217 365 575
com.gameloft.android.
ANMP.GloftA8HM
15532 7.0 274 181 126 16015 7.2 285 204 144 16016 6.6 285 204 144
com.appsorama.kleptocats 3659 2.7 101 106 39 3707 2.8 101 106 39 3714 3.3 101 112 39
air.au.com.metro.DumbWaysToDie 10059 4.9 204 151 23 10312 5.3 204 151 26 11679 5.9 228 167 103
com.ketchapp.twist 14092 8.7 210 179 93 14144 8.7 210 179 97 14151 8.7 210 185 109
com.stupeflix.legend 8803 3.1 97 127 46 8852 3.4 97 127 47 9066 3.5 97 127 47
com.maxgames.stickwarlegacy 3829 2.6 76 26 5 3831 2.5 76 26 5 3844 2.4 76 32 17
air.com.tutotoons.app.
animalhairsalon2jungle.free
11788 5.2 86 43 9 12075 5.5 86 43 9 12075 5.7 86 43 9
Total 167573 82.5 2508 2631 1418 170461 86 2520 2682 1486 181721 93.4 2608 2805 1796
in Soot. Ripple will be more precise if a more precise, say,
an object-sensitive pointer analysis [24] is used, instead.
In addition, Ripple will also be more precise if it works si-
multaneously with other static analyses, such as intent anal-
ysis, for Android apps. The code snippet in Figure 12 taken
from Seven Knights illustrates this proposition.
1 public class ReferralReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
2  private void sendOtherBroadcastReceiver(Context ctx, Intent intent) {
3   Intent criterion = new Intent("com.android.vending.INSTALL_REFERRER");
4   List<ResolveInfo> infoList = ctx.getPackageManager()
                                    .queryBroadcastReceivers(criterion, 0);
5   for(ResolveInfo info : infoList)
6    if(! getClass().getName().equals(info.activityInfo.name)) {
7     Class clz = Class.forName(info.activityInfo.name);
8     BroadcastReceiver bReceiver = (BroadcastReceiver) clz.newInstance();
9     bReceiver.onReceive(ctx, intent); } } }
Android App Name: Seven Knight
Figure 12: Improving precision in RIPPLE by work-
ing with intent analysis. Here, denotes data-
flow and denotes the class names discovered
after considering the constraints denoted by .
Class ReferralReceiver is a BroadcastReceiver, a ba-
sic component in Android. In method sendOtherBroadcas-
tReceiver(), an intent with action com.android.vending.
INSTALL_REFERRER is created (line 3) and used to find all the
BroadcastReceivers that can handle this intent (line 4). In
lines 5 – 9, appropriate ones are created reflectively (lines 7
– 8), on which onReceive() is called (line 9).
Ripple handles the incomplete information caused by Con-
text, which contains some global information about an app.
As ctx = null, info.activityInfo.name = null. Ripple
first applies [C3-ForName] to Class.forName(info.
activityInfo.name) in line 7 and then [C12-New] to clz.
newInstance() in line 8 to infer the reflectively created ob-
jects from the cast BroadcastReceiver. As BroadcastRe-
ceiver is often extended, bReceiver is made to point to 17
different types of objects with 15 being false positives.
If Ripple works with an advanced intent analysis, these
15 false positives may be all avoided. By assuming optimisti-
cally that ctx points to the Context of the current app, and
modeling the call queryBroadcastReceivers() to return the
information about all the components that can handle the
intent criterion, infoList will just contain the informa-
tion pertaining to the three BroadcastReceivers, Referral-
Receiver, GrowMobileInstallReceiver and Tracker. By
also filtering out ReferralReceiver path-sensitively in line
6, Ripple will now be able to make bReceiver to point to
only two objects precisely, one object of type GrowMobile-
InstallReceiver and one object of type Tracker, in line 8.
A similar pattern also appears in the app Cooking Fever.
6.3 RQ3: Scalability
Table 2 compares the analysis times of Ripple, StrInf,
and Spark (Soot’s pointer analysis without reflection anal-
ysis). For each app, the final harness that is iteratively con-
structed by FlowDroid (to discover callbacks) is used as
its main entry. For all the 17 apps except two (canteenhd
and angrybirds), Ripple finishes in under 10 secs. For all
the 17 apps combined, Spark, StrInf and Ripple spend a
total of 82.5, 86.0 and 93.4 seconds, respectively.
6.4 RQ4: Security Analysis
Table 2 also compares Ripple, StrInf and Spark in
terms of their effectiveness for enabling FlowDroid to find
sensitive data leaks in Android apps. For each analysis,
FlowDroid calls it iteratively to build a harness for an app
(by modeling more and more callbacks discovered) until a
fixed-point is reached. FlowDroid will then perform a flow-
and context-sensitive taint analysis on the inter-procedural
CFG, which is constructed based on the call graph (CG) that
is computed for the app with respect to the final harness ob-
tained. Thus, FlowDroid can be precise, in practice.
For each app, as shown in Table 2, the number of data
leaks, together with sensitive source and sink calls, found by
FlowDroid under Spark, StrInf and Ripple are com-
pared. As discussed in Section 6.1, Ripple finds more true
reflective targets than StrInf. For each app, Ripple’s CG
is always a super-graph of StrInf’s CG, which is always a
super-graph of Spark’s CG. In particular, Ripple’s CG is
larger than StrInf’s CG in 13 out of the 17 apps evaluated.
As a result, FlowDroid detects a total of 1,418, 1,486 and
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1,796 leaks under Spark, StrInf and Ripple, respectively.
Let us examine Ripple and StrInf in more detail. For
10 out of the 17 apps evaluated, FlowDroid reports the
same number of leaks for each app under both analyses.
However, for the remaining seven apps, FlowDroid reports
310 more leaks under Ripple than StrInf (highlighted by
the numbers in bold in the last column of Table 2). Ripple’s
ability in finding more true reflective targets in these apps
than StrInf, as shown in Table 1, has certainly paid off.
Let us revisit two examples discussed in Section 3 to un-
derstand reflection-induced privacy violations. Let us con-
sider the code taken from Angry Birds in Figure 2. Due to
an undermined intent, cName = null. Ripple infers a total
of five reflectively created objects for Class.newInstance()
in line 6 based on its post-dominant cast MMBaseActivity.
As discussed in Section 5.6, all these five objects are true tar-
gets configured to provide different forms of advertisement,
enabling FlowDroid to detect 49 leaks that are missed by
StrInf, on the methods called directly or indirectly on these
objects. For this entire app, FlowDroid finds 54 more leaks
under Ripple than StrInf. A similar code pattern also ap-
pears in Dumb Ways to Die where FlowDroid finds 77
more leaks under Ripple than StrInf.
Let us now consider the code snippet taken from Twist in
Figure 3. Ripple infers that i(), d(), w(), e(), v() and
wtf() in class Log, where the last two are false positives,
are the potential targets invoked at logMtd.invoke(null,
tag, msg) in line 6. Some sensitive data may be acciden-
tally passed to msg and get written to log files, resulting
in potential security vulnerabilities. Due to the six target
methods discovered, FlowDroid finds a total of 12 data
leaks (= 2 sources × 6 sinks) from two sensitive sources, of
which 4 from v() and wtf() are false positives.
7. RELATED WORK
We review only the most relevant work on reflection anal-
ysis for Android apps and Java programs.
Android Apps. Ernst et al. [10] presentedChecker, a data-
flow analysis for Android apps with reflective calls handled
later [6]. As for the reflection resolution approach used,
Checker performs regular string inference as DroidRA
for constant class and method names but requires user an-
notations to handle non-constant class and method names.
In contrast, Ripple aims to automatically infer reflection
targets at reflective calls according to the type information
available.
Li et al. [17] introduced DroidRA, a string inference anal-
ysis for resolving reflection in Android apps. In this work,
the reflection resolution problem is reduced to one of solving
a constant string propagation in the program. In DroidRA,
reflective calls can only be resolved if their class and method
names are constants and ignored otherwise.
Rasthofer et al. [31] developed Harvester, an approach
for automatically extracting runtime values from Android
apps. Harvester takes an Android installation package
and performs a backward slicing starting at a point of inter-
est. Afterwards, a new, reduced package is generated and
executed on a stock Android emulator or real phone to log
the values of interest at runtime, such as some class and
method names that are dynamically loaded and invoked via
reflection. Harvester is designed to fight against code ob-
fuscation techniques in order to extract runtime values, such
as class and method names, that may be first encrypted and
then used in reflection calls under some particular inputs.
In contrast, Ripple attempts to infer reflective targets used
under these and other circumstances statically under all pos-
sible inputs. It will be interesting to investigate how to
combine dynamic techniques such as Harvester and static
reflection analyses such as Ripple to make a desired tradeoff
among soundness, precision and scalability.
Zhauniarovich et al. [47] introduced Stadyna, a system
that interleaves static and dynamic analysis in order to re-
veal the program behaviors caused by dynamic code up-
date techniques, such as dynamic class loading and reflec-
tion. Stadyna requires a modified Android virtual machine
to log the side-effects of program behaviors at runtime, in-
cluding the targets accessed at reflective calls. This online
analysis approach involves human efforts (e.g., in preparing
for test inputs), but with no guarantee for code coverage.
In contrast, Ripple is a static reflection analysis, enabling
it to be integrated with a range of static security analyses,
such as FlowDroid, to achieve improved code coverage and
soundness, as demonstrated in this paper.
Java Programs. There are several reflection analysis tech-
niques for Java programs [18, 19, 21, 37]. Earlier, Livshits
et al. [21] suggested to discover reflective targets by tracking
the flow of string constants representing class/method/field
names and infer reflective targets based on post-dominating
type casts for Class.newInstance() calls if their class names
are statically unknown strings. Recently, Li. et al. intro-
duced Elf [18] and Solar [19] to apply sophisticated type
inference to resolve reflective targets effectively. In particu-
lar, Solar is able to accurately identify where reflection is
resolved unsoundly or imprecisely. In addition, it provides a
mechanism to balance soundness, precision and scalability,
representing a state-of-the-art solution for Java. A recent
program slicing technique, called program tailoring [20], can
also be leveraged to resolve reflection calls precisely. How-
ever, all the reflection analysis techniques proposed for Java
cannot resolve a reflective call fully if the data-flows needed
(e.g., class or method names) at the call are null.
Reflection analysis usually works together with pointer
analysis in order to discover the targets at reflective calls.
For pointer analysis techniques developed for Java programs,
we refer to [16, 23–25, 34, 35, 38–40, 44].
8. CONCLUSION
Due to the ubiquity of mobile phones and the rapid de-
velopment of other connected mobile devices (e.g., tablets
and e-books), security vulnerabilities in Android apps, espe-
cially the presence of reflection, pose major security threats.
In this paper, we introduce a reflection analysis for Android
apps for discovering the behaviors of reflective calls, which
can cause directly or indirectly security vulnerabilities such
as privacy violations. We advance the state-of-the-art reflec-
tion analysis for Android apps, by (1) bringing forward the
ubiquity of IIEs for static analysis, (2) introducing Ripple,
the first IIE-aware reflection analysis, and (3) demonstrat-
ing that Ripple can resolve reflection in real-world Android
apps precisely and efficiently, and consequently, improve the
effectiveness of downstream Android security analyses.
In future work, we plan to combine Ripple with some
dynamic analysis and integrate Ripple with an advanced
pointer analysis to improve both soundness and precision.
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